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Co-operatives are important in Kenya. But, it might be argued, they
are not that important: why should they be made a focal point of
research into agrarian change and government strategy towards the
peasantry?
The answer, for present purposes, is that the co-operative structure is
both the means chosen by the Kenyan government for integrating
the peasantry (or sections within it) into the "modern" capitalist
economy, and secondly, very often the most visible and important
means of political and economic mobility for ambitious peasants.
Marketing co-operatives are not of course the only means of
accomplishing these varying ends - for example they do not yet
exist, on the whole, where there is not an established peasant-grown
cash crop - but there is no doubt that in the Kenyan context they
fulfil those needs where crucial crops and regions of the country are
concerned, and they provide a vital mechanism of political control
and political advancement for important sections of rural society.1
The problems which research must engage in this field, therefore, are
at two levels.
Firstly, and in the long run more importantly, one must be able to
evaluate the Kenyan co-operative movement's role as a mediating or
articulating mechanism, in terms of its role in the transformation of
non-capitalist modes of production in the rural areas of Kenya. Here
the analysis would centre on the extremely complex interaction
between the dominant capitalist and the non-capitalist modes,
particularly in terms of differing social divisions of labour and of
class formation, and in terms of the central importance of state
institutions in controlling the process.
* Geoff Lamb is a Fellow of the Institute.
25
1 See e.g. Lamb,Peasant Politics, (Julian Friedman, London, 1974). Chapters V
and VI.
26 GOVERNMENT, CO-OPERATIVES AND PEASANT AGRICUTLURE
IN KENYA
But secondly, this overall analysis of the structure of social relations
needs to come to grips with the question of policy: i.e. to what
extent should various government policies, and particularly those in
the agricultural sector, be seen as embodying coherent socio-political
strategies? And, to the extent that they can be so seen, what is the
relationship between those ends and what actually happens? The
importance of this latter point, of course, is not to point to obvious
and inevitable disparities, but to clarify the way in which both
institutional processes and other processes of economic and political
change are actually changing the pattern of Kenyan peasant life, and
therefore what new problems are developing for the state as it tries
to control rural events. This article discusses some issues arising out
of this second point.
There is not too much difficulty in sketching the general direction of
Kenyan agricultural strategy since independence. Government policy
has been one of adapting the colonial structure of agricultural
production by the removal of the two most glaring anomalies, but
otherwise by encouraging growth within the established framework.
Thus the late colonial period saw the progressive removal of the legal
and administrative obstacles to the participation of Africans in cash
crop production, while the central feature of agrarian policy in the
first years of independence was the establishment of some 35,000
African families on over one million acres of formerly white
settler-owned land, generally at densities far lower than those
obtaining in the African reserves. These measures not only
encouraged a very rapid rise in African small farm (i.e. peasant)
production within a decade to approximately half the total marketed
agricultural output, but also in effect provided political protection
for the capitalist farm sector, which has become Africanized to a
considerable degree in the decade since independence. The
independent government, in addition, has adopted and extended the
late colonial policy of "reproducing the peasant mode of
production" by a land consolidation and registration which has
rationalised and stabilised existing patterns of distribution, and
provided the basis in tenure for extension and credit policies which
have up to now likewise operated decisively n favour of wealthier
peasants - that is, to the relatively small extent that extension and
credit was not concentrated in the capitalist farm sector!
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But when one turns to the institutions concerned with agrarian
policy, the picture becomes very complicated indeed. Aside from the
co-operative movement, there is the whole elaborate parastatal
structure of marketing and processing boards and agencies, each with
its own bureaucracy, each enjoying legally and administratively
defined areas of predominance or monopoly, each standing in a
particular relationship to peasant and other producers, to the
international economy, and to the régime and its clients. There is the
overwhelming presence of the administration (that is, of the general
administrative service under the office of the president) in the rural
areas, with the district commissioners wielding wide but sometimes
unclear administrative and political power over other government
agencies and over the rural population. And there are the technical
ministries, especially of course agriculture, and functions like that of
community development which are important in terms of
government control over potentially autonomous social organisation,
and as a "welfare" element for the benefit of those left out by the
rich-peasant orientation of agricultural policy.
Government's relationships with the co-operative movement in
Kenya have for long been characterised by considerable ambiguity -
an ambiguity which reflects, as much as anything, the uncertain role
which co-operative societies play in Kenyan peasant society. Until
some time after the last war, the colonial government viewed African
co-operatives with profound suspicion, for precisely the same reasons
that any worthwhile advance in African agriculture was unwelcome
and often suppressed: that substantial agricultural advance in the
African areas represented a threat to the interests of the settler
community and to the interests of the colonial administration in
terms of economic changes and a potential threat to political control.
A major reason for the change in governmental attitudes towards
co-operatives, of course, has been the advent of independence and a
new kind of emphasis on rural development: bu in one respect
which is extremely germane to the present problems of the Kenyan
movement, that change stems from the bureaucratic requirements of
the terminal colonial period, from the need for continuing an
efficient state control over the Kenyan peasantry.
In many areas of Kenya, including such high-production regions as
Central Province, co-operatives have come into being less as a
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response to exploitation by middlemen (as in the Uganda cotton
case, for example), but more often because of direct administrative
encouragement and to fulfil clear administrative needs. Particularly
during the late 1950s, there were undoubtedly "idealistic" colonial
administrators - district officers, agriculturists and others -- who saw
co-operatives as a means of community development and equitable
control of the new economic opportunities in the Kenyan
countryside. At the same time, however, co-operative development
fell into a category of devices which needed to be used to control the
countryside: particularly in Central Province, co-operatives were
integrated into the colonial strategy of re-making the social structure
of African society, by altering the basis of land tenure, by
encouraging the introduction of cash crops which had hitherto been
effectively unavailable to Africans - a strategy, in short, designed to
maximise the state's ability to control events in the countryside, by
endowing the administration with desirable resources (registration,
credit, extension, etc.) which the upper sectors of the re-structured
peasantry could utilise. To the extent that the colonial strategy in
the rural areas in the 1950s was designed as a political weapon to
counteract the influence of nationalism, it clearly failed: in the
process, however, there had grown up an impressive structure of state
influence in the peasant areas which has continued and indeed
expanded up to the present - administrative and technical agencies
with wide powers over individual farmers, an elaborate structure of
state marketing boards, far-reaching statutory powers over rural
institutions such as co-operatives.
Thus, while the Kenyan government has emphasised individual
enterprise and achievement, and has been happy to see the
emergence of private entrepreneurs in the countryside and in urban
areas, it has nevertheless inherited and expanded a considerable
capacity for controlling agricultural life. Even the colonial
co-operative ordinance, which provided for a considerable degree of
government control of co-operative societies, has been succeeded by
new legislation (Co-operative Societies Act 1966) giving government
even wider powers of control. The commissioner of co-operative
development is given powers of registration, dissolution and
compulsory amalgamation over co-operative societies, power to
supervise budgets, approve the hiring and dismissal of graded staff,
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and approve society bye-laws and resolutions, to control financial
transactions through the counter-signature of cheques and other
instruments, ad sundry other powers to ensure that co-operatives
are run in an honest and efficient manner. Co-operatives are
thoroughly integrated into the state marketing board system, and at
the same time state and co-operative control over individual farmers
greatly extended, by the provisions allowing the minister to require
all producers of a particular crop to dispose of it through the
co-operatives, provided only that the co-operatives in that area (or
throughout the country) can show that their members produce not
less than 60% of the crop.
There are thus very strong pressures on farmers to join co-operatives,
in many cases, and these are backed up in some areas by better access
to credit, extension, and other services for co-operative members
than for "private" smallholders. The full import of these pressures,
and of the ramifications of the co-operative cum state marketing
structure, become apparent when the extent of the powers which
co-operative societies in Kenya have over their members is indicated.
Societies may, for example, enter into contracts with outside bodies
which entail pledging the produce of its members as security; they
may fine members for disobeying the bye-laws of the society; they
may contract with members to produce and sell through the society
a specified amount of produce, and exact damages for failure; they
exercise preferential charges over members' goods and chattels for
the discharge of debts to the society.2
Co-operative Leadership
It is quite clear that members' rights of attending general meetings
and electing alternative managements do little to constrain the
potential of such wide powers. Given not only the bureaucratic
origins, in many cases, of Kenyan co-operatives, but also continuing
state determination to exercise even closer control over the societies
hence over the economic affairs of thousands of peasant farmers -
the nature of the relationship between government and the local
2 There is an excellent critical summary of the legislation by J.P.WB. McAuslan
in Co-operatives and Rural Development in East Africa, edited by Carl Gosta
Widstrand, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1970.
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co-operative leaderships assumes crucial importance. The questions
thus not only revolve around whether co-operative management
committees are oppressing their memberships in any way (by
cheating them, or by wasting their proceeds, for example), but
whether the role of government improves the position of the
peasantry vis-à-vis its local leaders, aggravates smaliholders' problems,
or simply makes very little impact specifically in the field of
co-operative reform.
This specific government role of interceding, in one way or another,
between peasant co-operative members and their management
committees has for long been identified by the government itself as
central to the task of co-operative reform, as we shall see. But why?
Plainly, because the richer peasants who control the co-operatives
have been dishonest, or incompetent, or both, and because they have
used the co-operatives as instruments of political power in the rural
areas. Government determination to rid the movement of corruption
and incompetence, of course, stems from the fact that these
shortcomings are extremely bad for efficiency, for "morale", for
commitment, as well as grossly inequitable; its opposition to the
politicisation of the co.operatives is more an aspect of the
characteristic Kenyan concern with close political and administrative
control of the countryside, than to do with specific opposition to the
kulaks.
Since we are here less concerned with the nature of specific
counter-measures than with the social and political environment
which produces these problems, it is perhaps not necessary to itemise
the different kinds of fraud and mismanagement which are quite
common features of Kenyan primary societies. Some examples which
illustrate the difficulties of control, however, might perhaps be
mentioned here. One of the flagrant abuses which the 1966
Co-operative Societies Rules set out to check was the profligate
issuing of loans and other payments to committee members, their
relatives, or their clients. Hence, in part, the requirement that the
district co-operative officer and the secretary-manager of the
district co-operative union should countersign all cheques. What has
happened in many cases, however, is that management committees
have mitigated the effect of this provision (where it was being
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effectively enforced) by ensuring that societies built up as large a
cash balance on the premises as possible, from members' payments
and the like, to avoid uncomfortable supervision of the more
profitable part of their financial dealings. Holding large sums of cash
also allowed corrupt committees to circumvent the rule requiring all
supplies to be ordered through the union, and not by private
arrangements with local wholesalers. The incentive to continue
buying such supplies as fertiliser, building materials, and the like at
much higher prices than the union, with its large orders and more
open tendering and ordering methods, could offer - stems from the
"personal discount" system, whereby committee members in effect
split the difference between local price and union price with the local
wholesaler.
In many other areas - such as the preferential grading of committee
members' produce, or the pressuring of primary society hired staff to
acquiesce in corrupt practices - the reforms effected in 1966 and
since then have undoubtedly had a beneficial effect. The experience
of recent years has also served .to demonstrate, however, that
co-operatives are far less amenable to control, which is the sense in
which reform has been defined in Kenya, than had earlier been
thought. What has emerged as a central feature of co-operative
problems, in other words, has not, by and large, been susceptible to
reform by the available methods: the crucial problem, that is, has
been the domination of co-operative societies by the most powerful
elements in the rural areas. The reasons for this dominance are as
simple as the mechanisms whereby dominance is maintained are
complex: co-operative societies control economic resources, access to
valued people and services, and the opportunity for political
advancement, all of which will be eagerly sought and bitterly fought
over in any poor community. What is less obvious is the nature of the
connections between the co-operatives and the institutions alongside
which they operate, or which they at times disrupt and displace, and
it is here that efforts to effect reform often produce unintended
consequences.
The problem of co-operatives operating to the advantage of the
richer peasants and against the interests of the poorer thus has much
to do with the fact that co-operatives were assiduously encouraged
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by government agencies, in a situation where they merely provided
yet another avenue for the entrepreneurial activities of aspirant
kulaks. As Guy Hunter has said:
". . . such institutions as co-operatives, farmers' clubs or
associations, have to be formed with the greatest political care.
The safest (and often the most successful) form of co-operative is
based on a clear technical reason - the sharing of a single tubewell
by a few small farmers, the common use of storage, dairy
equipment, etc. The most politically and socially fatal is the
general fiat 'let co-operatives be' which is an open invitation to the
old hierarchy to capture them."3
Co-operatives in Kenya, therefore, have been caught between the
desire of government for control over the agricultural surplus (and its
choice of co-operatives as one appropriate mechanism), and the
alacrity of rural leaderships in seizing on this new institution as a
means of increasing income and augmenting political power. At the
same time, of course, government itself is intimately connected with
rural powerholders, and to the extent that co-operative reform really
damages the position of rural political-economic elites, one can
expect strong pressures for change in policy. What must be seriously
questioned, therefore, is whether the solution to what has emerged as
a primarily political problem can realistically be sought in the series
of administrative and educational measures currently being
undertaken or envisaged.
Administrative Control as a Political Strategy
It can be persuasively argued that administrative control as a
technical solution to co-operative problems has already failed - if
only because of the fact that it has been put forward as the most
desirable strategy at least since 1966 and the Co-operative Societies
Act, and to a considerable extent eveti before that (e.g. in colonial
warnings about the need for "careful supervision"). Certainly the
emphasis in government policy has since 1966 been on developing
administrative capacities to regulate, supervise, merge, and in general
"Agriculture and Social Development" in A.H. Bunting, cd., Change in
Agriculture. Duckworth, London, 1970, p. 33.
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control co-operatives, not only in the 1966 Act and Rules but in the
Development Plan,4 and in policy statements5 and reviews of
performance6, where administrative expansion and the increase of
administrative expertise is treated as a priority. If close control and
supervision are so vital, and yet so difficult to achieve, what is the
particular advantage of co-operatives as instruments of rural
development? It would seem that the problems so far encountered in
extending official capacity are so serious, and yet the impetus to go
on trying so great, that the theoretical saving in government
manpower and expertise (and investment) which co-operatives
should effect, is largely lost. At the same time, other costs are being
incurred - it cannot be beneficial for either government or the
co-operative movement for peasants to perceive primary societies and
district unions as a part of the bureaucratic structure, as in many
instances they clearly do7 - or at least not beneficial in conventional
terms.
Thus the co-operative élites have suffered the closure of some of
their opportunities for enrichment, and attempts to devalue their
local influence by enhancing the powers of district unions (as well as
government officials), without their dominance of primary societies
being in any way fundamentally challenged. The employees of
co-operative societies, while they have been given some security of
tenure (in that government consent to the dismissal of graded staff is
required), have likewise been subjected to increasing intervention and
declining opportunities for increasing their income, without being
provided with one of their perceived needs, a career structure which
provides a real incentive for honest and efficient management and
the learning of more advanced skills. At the same time, rank and file
members of primary societies have as yet little reason to change their
view either of their societies or of the bureaucratic structure which
Development Plan 1970/74, pp. 276-81.
Co-operative Development Policy for Kenya, Sessional Paper 8/1970.
6 E.g. Economic Survey 1971, pp. 74/5, and the Dept. of Co-operative
Development's own 1972 Plan.
7 Especially in the case of the district co-operative unions, which government is
deliberately transforming into an instrument for enforcing policy see
Development Plan 1966/70, pp. 201.
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supervises it. They still have little effective choice about joining a
co-operative, given that they desire access to certain crops and
accompanying services, and they still lack any real opportunity (or
knowledge) to change the faction- and patronage- dominated
leadership styles in the societies. Whatever officials of the
i)epartment of Co-operatives achieve through increased supervision,
it is not an increase in the autonomous capacity of ordinary peasants
to control their institutional environment. And, of course, issues of
motivation, of the "communal good" and the "co-operative spirit",
do not even begin to become relevant in this situation.
But here, of course, we return to the distinction between formally
stated policy aims and the impact of policy. It is reasonable to
suppose that the Kenyan government is concerned to "clean-up"
co-operatives: it is not reasonable to suppose that in doing so the
regime is prepared to confront the holders of political and economic
power in the countryside. But, intriguingly, the matter is not quite as
simple as that.
The cumulative impact of the state's agrarian strategy, which was
referred to at the outset, is to underline and in many circumstances
to exacerbate inequality and social differentiation. This is equally
true in the co-operatives. The distribution of income between
co-operative members is generally highly unequal - especially where
well-established and high-value crops such as coffee are concerned,
where inequalities of coffee income between the top 15-20% of
members and the rest are likely typically to run at a factor of 10 to 1
in terms of the average income in each group. Furthermore, capital
levies, political contributions, "voluntary" donations - such as the
huge donations for the district-based Colleges of Advanced
Technology currently being sponsored in Kenya - are steeply
regressive, since they usually involve across-the-board equal
deductions from individual members' proceeds.
At the same time, however, there are two factors which militate
against the co-operatives, at any rate, operating to promote rural
capitalism on any appreciable scale. Firstly, since leadership in the
co-operatives is predominantly a political affair - i.e. it demands the
construction of political followings and their maintenance on a more
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or less mercenary basis - the legal and illegal benefits of leadership
tend to be rather expensively won, and the surplus for accumulation
and investment in productive activities is limited to that extent. One
might also point out, here, that costs of marketing for peasants in
Kenya tend to be rather high because of the very elaborate parastatal
marketing structures which are financed from gross crop proceeds: a
sizable part of the peasant surplus is therefore creamed off directly
by various sections of the state apparatus.
Secondly, the co-operatives, as we have seen, form part of the
developing structure of state control in the Kenyan countryside, and
that control has also been deployed to ensure that social disruption is
kept at a minimum. Thus the administration places great emphasis
not only on obedience, but on social cohesion and group activity
(like self-help) under state auspices, while the more flagrant kinds of
accumulation (like evictions) are simply disallowed in many cases,
irrespective of the sanction of law. The effect of policy toward the
co-operative movement in recent years has been consistent with this
tendency, in that disruption of production and possible political
conflict have been averted by curbing obvious excesses and by
incorporating co-operatives more firmly into the state machine, while
the dominant position gf the peasant leadership has not been
seriously threatened.
It has been argued in recent years in Kenya that this situation
precludes full advantage being taken of the productive possibilities of
peasant agriculture: the implication is that would-be agrarian
capitalists are waiting to emerge from the peasant masses once the
institutional shackles are removed. This may be: the more relevant
point, however, is that co-operatives are so important, to state and
peasantry alike, precisely because they provide avenues of economic
mobility (for some) so far without the widespread development of
capitalist relations of production and ensuing patterns of class
formation. Capitalist development in Kenya is not, on the whole,
taking place within the peasant areas, but outside them. What is
happening in most of the rural areas is differentiated development of
agriculture on a basically peasant basis under conditions of tight
political control. The quiescence of the rural areas is thus for the
present dependent on the maintenance of that control and, by
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implication, on the preclusion of rapid transformation of the social
relations of production, particularly in the politically sensitive areas
where peasant cash crop production is well established. Hence
Kenyan rural development policy has laid increasing emphasis on
bringing the more backward areas into the cash economy - i.e. to
commercialise them rather than introduce new forms of production
concurrently with the extension of communications and
administrative facilities.
Whether the "controlled peasant economy" strategy can continue to
work in the more advanced areas, however, is open to some degree of
question, particularly in times of production difficulties and, in some
areas, incipient food crises. In these circumstances, the co-operatives
assume a wider political significance: despite their partial
subordination to administrative control, they nevertheless offer the
only current means of political mobilisation to crucial sections of
Kenya's upper and middle peasants. The point is not that the
co-operatives might become insurrectionary: they will not. The
development of widespread political struggle within them, however,
may well be a sign that the political arrangements for containing
rural change within manageable bounds are breaking down.
